what care arrangements will serve the best interests of the child involves the court in making a value judgement based on its findings of fact in its exercise of inherent jurisdiction as the upper guardian of minor children. 4 In divorce proceedings where children are involved, it is the duty of the court to decide on the refuge of the children after the dissolution of the marriage. The final decision in the granting of care lies with the court, and it is here that principle of the best interests of the child 5 is strictly applied. The decision taken by the court in granting care to a parent or other person has a significant impact on the lives of children and can influence their future substantially, not only in the short term but also in the long term.
The best interests of every child cannot be determined absolutely, and several factors or criteria to be taken into account in a range of matters relating to the wellbeing of children have been developed over time by means of case law 6 and legislation. 7 These includes factors such as the ability of a parent to provide the basic needs of a child, such as food, clothes, shelter and other material needs, and the love, affection and other emotional ties that exist between the parent and the child.
A question that arises in the determination of the best interests of the child is whether equal attention should be given to every possible aspect and consideration pertaining to the child's life, or whether certain considerations could be of less concern. 8 Should the court take into account factors such as the significantly higher salary of one party, and therefore the ability to provide better schooling, medical For a discussion of whether the best interest principle is a standard or a right see Boezaart "General Principles" 2-10 to 2-14.
In several of the cases that will be discussed throughout this contribution, specifically Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V 1998 4 SA 169 (C) (hereafter referred to as V v V), the issue before the court was the right of a homosexual parent to access (to contact) his or her minor child. It is noted, however, that although the right of a parent to contact a minor child falls beyond the scope of the study, it may serve as an useful indicator as to the objective of the study, as the principle of the best interests of the child applies equally in both care and contact matters. Further it is noted that the common-law terms of "custody" and "care" are not used in the Children's Act. Even though they appear to have replaced the terms "access" and "contact", the court found in WW v EW 2011 6 SA 53 (KZP) (hereafter referred to as WW v EW) that were living with their father, who had been granted sole custody in the divorce from their mother. The court stated that the children were still of a young age and accordingly it was in their best interests if they did not get wrong ideas regarding sexuality and the ways in which a man and a woman should live together. The applicant was permitted to exercise reasonable rights of access to her minor children subject to the condition that she would not share a room with her lesbian partner when her children slept over at their home.
17
Since the introduction of the new constitutional era, the changes in approach taken by the courts in the making of care decisions have been significant. In the post-1994
case of V v V, 18 the issue before the court related to the custody and access arrangements regarding the concerned parties. An order was sought by the plaintiff not only for custody of the children, but also to allow the defendant access under supervision and a provision granting that whenever the defendant exercised her access to the children, no third person would share the same residence or sleep under the same roof as the defendant and the children. 19 The reason for this condition became apparent only after it was submitted that the children were being subjected to the allegedly harmful influence of a lesbian relationship between the mother and her partner. 20 The plaintiff's objection was that the children would be mentally, emotionally and spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle their mother and her lesbian companion shared, and stated that he did not wish to have his children exposed to what he regarded as unhealthy practices in their mother's home. 21 The court stated that it was clear that the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 22 made a moral judgement about what is normal and correct insofar as sexuality is concerned, and that the judge clearly regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal.
while the concepts correspond broadly, they are not synonymous. Therefore, since the decision in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V is dated before the new Children's Act came into force, the courts still refer to the terms as "custody" and "access" instead of "care" and "contact".
Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 331E-G-I.
18
V v V 173H-I. 19 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 173I-J, 174B. 20 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 174C-D.
21
V v V 174F-G.
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Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 188F-H. Since the coming into operation of the Children's Act, certain common-law terms that existed in the amended Child Care Act, 23 such as "custody", have been supplemented with "care", and "access", which has been supplemented with "contact". The court found in WW v EW 24 that even though the statutory concepts correspond broadly with the common-law concepts, they are wider than the latter.
The effect of the court's interpretation of the Act is that the term "custody" can be used interchangeably with "care", and "access" with "contact".
25
The term "custody", before it was supplemented 26 for the term "care", related to the parent's control and supervision over the person and day-to-day life of a child. 27 It related to control over the child in most areas of his/her life, such as the control of religion and religious education, and the restriction of the people with whom the minor could associate. The Children's Act, on the other hand, introduced the doctrine of "parental responsibilities and rights", which include to a certain extent the common-law doctrine of "parental authority". 28 The parental responsibilities and rights include the duty to care for the child, maintain contact with the child, act as guardian to the child, and contribute to the maintenance of the child. 29 The concept of care therefore entails a more comprehensive notion of a parent's daily life in relation to the child, and the powers and duties that are expected to ensure the general protection, well-being and best interests of the child. All decisions and actions regarding the child should generally be performed in the child's best interests, in a manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of development.
23
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (hereafter referred to as the Child Care Act).
24
WW v EW para 21.
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26
The word "substituted" has also been used. See Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 66; Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 66.
28
Which included custody, access and guardianship. Also referred to as "parental power". For a discussion of the doctrine see Van Heerden "Parental Power" 313-325 and the authority quoted in n 17.
29
Section 18(2) of the Children's Act. The aim of this contribution is to discuss the sexual orientation of a parent as a factor for consideration in the granting of care in respect of children, and the extent to which courts may give consideration to such a factor. The article will also address the question of whether or not the role of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has changed since care replaced custody as a concept in the Children's Act. In this article, care and the best interests of the child will be discussed first. International law will be considered thereafter, followed by a discussion of the approach of our courts, pre-and post-1994, in order to come to a conclusion and make recommendations. as a result the antagonism between the parents often becomes so strong that they cannot reach consensus as to the best interests of the children. 36 One might argue that when a parent's sexual orientation is an additional factor in child care disputes, this adds to the antagonism between parents and therefore also adds to the impact such disputes have on children.
The guiding principle in all matters involving children is that the best interests of the children are paramount. 37 Courts are compelled to place emphasis on the standard of the best interests of the child, not only due to their role as upper guardians of all minors, but also due to the fact that this provision is entrenched in section 28(2) of the Constitution, as well as sections 7 and 9 of the Children's Act. What is in the best interests of a specific child cannot be determined with absolute certainty, and one needs to make use of the guidelines and factors set out in case law and legislation, such as in the case of McCall v McCall and section 7 of the Children's Act. The following section of this article includes a comprehensive discussion of the definition of the new concept of "care" and the old concept of "custody", and the factors and criteria set out in case law and legislation regarding the standard of the best interests of the child.
Care
Children have become the main focus where parental responsibilities and rights are concerned.
38 The Children's Act introduced the doctrine of "parental responsibilities and rights" in section 18 and it includes, to some extent, the common-law doctrine In V v V 176C-D Judge Foxcroft stated the following: "There is no doubt that over the last number of years the emphasis in thinking in regard to questions of relationships between parents and their children had shifted from a concept of parental power of the parents to one of parental responsibility and children's rights. Children's rights are no longer confined to the located in the common law, the Children's Act incorporates the concept of parental responsibilities and rights within its statutes, 41 and therefore it has not been codified from the term parental authority. It can further be noted that the Children's Act refers to the phrase "parental responsibilities and rights" rather than "parental rights and responsibilities". Skelton 42 argues that the reason for this less common construction of the phrase is to emphasise the importance of a parent's responsibilities towards a child first, and only thereafter the importance of a parent's rights towards a child. 43 The doctrine of parental responsibilities and rights includes the right of the parents to care for the child, maintain contact with the child, act as his or her guardian and contribute to his or her maintenance.
44
Since this article discusses the granting of care to a homosexual parent in divorce proceedings, it is necessary to establish initially what was expected of parents in relation to the old concept of "custody" and what is expected of them in relation to the new concept of "care".
The common-law definition of the term "custody" has been described as "relating to the control and supervision of the daily life and person of the child". 45 A custodial parent had to care for, support and guide the child, and take responsibility for the health, education, safety and general welfare of the child. 46 The court in Kastan v Kastan 47 described the custody of a child as the taking of day-to-day decisions regarding children as well as decisions of longer and more permanent duration common law, but also find expression in s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996, not to mention a wide range of international conventions." Judge Foxcroft (at 176E) further stated that: "parental power … is made up of two distinct elements. The one is guardianship and the other is custody. Guardians take decisions regarding a child's property and person, whereas custodians have control over the day-to-day life of the child."
40
For an overview of the historic development of parental authority see Fundamina 84-112. 41 Sections 18-21, 27, 30, 31 and 40 of the Children's Act. 42 Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 63.
43
These rights should be regarded not only as in the best interest of the child, but should also be performed in his or her best interest, and no parental right will be enforced if it is in conflict with the child's interests. See ss 35(1), 35(2)(a), 39(5)(a) and 150(1)(g) of the Children's Act. S 1(2) states: "In addition to the meaning assigned to the terms 'custody' and 'access' in any law, and the common law, the terms 'custody' and 'access' in any law must be construed to also mean 'care' and 'contact' as defined in this Act." acknowledged the fact that "care" appeared to have a broader scope than the term "custody".
The court found in WW v EW para 21 that while the statutory concepts of care and contact correspond broadly to the common-law terms of custody and access, they are not synonymous. The court was of the opinion that the common-law concepts have been given a wider meaning.
See WW v EW para 26.
50
Section 1(1) of the Children's Act.
It is noted, however, that although the duty of care expects more of a parent, both concepts (care and custody involve similar requirements. Custody has to do with a parent's day-to-day power over decisions regarding their children, such as the supervision and control of the child, and the persons with whom the child may associate, and basic duties such as ensuring the child's good health, welfare and happiness.
51
The parent must ensure that the child's rights as set out in the Constitution and the Children's Act are respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled, 52 and must guide the child's upbringing and development. As the term "care" suggests, a parent's duties regarding a child as set out in the Children's Act mostly involve responsibilities rather than rights in respect of a child, whereas the effect of the term "custody" is to emphasise the authority that a parent has over a child. 53 It remains to be seen if the South African court's approach to the concept of "care" will differ from their approach to the concept of "custody". Proudlock and Skelton 54 are of the opinion that the South-African courts will have to adapt the previous concepts to the new definitions of care and contact. ACRWC, which was adopted nine years after the CRC, contains provisions very similar to those of the CRC, and is intended to be complementary to other international and regional conventions. This is also applicable to other international conventions. They thus need to be read and interpreted together.
70
When States Parties ratify the CRC as well as the ACRWC, they are required to undertake a review of their domestic legislation and administrative measures in order to ensure that they comply with the obligations set out in the treaties. 71 These obligations are provided for in article 4 of the CRC and article 1 of the ACRWC. This process, which has been referred to as "domestication", is performed under the country's constitutional provisions in the enacting and amending of legislation, and therefore gives international law the same status as domestic law.
72
The following section will focus on the similarities and, where applicable, differences between the provisions of the CRC and ACRWC. It will also attempt to investigate the rights relating to the interests of children in the granting of care to a parent in divorce proceedings, where the sexual orientation of a parent plays a role in the consideration thereof. These will include the principle of the best interests of the child, the right of a child to non-discrimination, and the right of a child who is capable of forming his or her own views to express those views freely in all matters concerning him or her.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and African

Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
The adoption of the CRC has brought about a significant shift in how the global community thinks of and treats children, as the fundamental requirement for the implementation of the CRC can be described as the recognition of the child as a full human being and respect for the rights they hold. 73 Since the South African government ratified the CRC it has committed itself to and assumed the responsibilities of achieving the goals set out in the CRC. 74 Signing and ratifying a treaty such as the CRC creates a presumption in international law that the courts will not give rulings that are contrary to the international treaty obligations of the State, and that a State Party assumes an obligation to give effect to the treaty in domestic law.
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The preamble of the CRC refers to certain rights and freedoms that are of significant importance to the central theme of this study. These rights and freedoms are important as they emphasise the fact that children have certain material, emotional
and psychological needs, and should grow up in a family environment filled with happiness, love and understanding. This should happen in an environment where everyone in the family is treated equally and with dignity and respect.
In its preamble the ACRWC also refers to certain rights and freedoms that are of significant importance to children, such as:
Recognising that the child occupies a unique and privileged position in the African society and that for the full and harmonious development of his personality, the child should grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. Own emphasis.
77
The Children's Act states in its preamble: "it is necessary to effect changes to existing laws relating to children in order to afford them the necessary protection and assistance so that they can fully assume their responsibilities within the community as well as that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment and in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding."
Non-discrimination
The non-discrimination clause of the CRC is entrenched in article 2. an adolescent, it can be argued that a parent's right to non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is also protected by the CRC.
The non-discrimination clause of the ACRWC is entrenched in article 3. Article 3
provides that every child shall be entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms set out in In recognising the vulnerability of a child and the lack of provision for the protection of children's right's in general, the standard of the best interests of the child is protected by means of article 3, and is described by Mezmur 84 as "the yardstick by which to measure all the actions, laws and policies affecting children". It can also be described as one of the most significant accomplishments of the CRC, as it applies to all actions concerning children, thereby including both individuals and groups. 85 Article 4(1) of the ACRWC emphasises the best interests of the child, providing that in actions taken by any person or authority concerning a child, the child's best interest shall be the primary consideration. One can note that the CRC only makes provision for the phrase "a primary consideration", whereas the ACRWC makes provision for the phrase "the primary consideration". 88 Even though the difference is 86
Article 3 of the CRC states that: "(1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. (2) States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. only one word, it creates a large difference in the amount of weight to be applied to the principle. Whereas "a primary consideration" as provided for in the CRC implies that the standard of the best interest of the child is to be afforded equal weight along with other considerations, the phrase "the primary consideration", as contained in the ACRWC, implies that the standard of the best interests of the child must carry a greater weight than competing rights and provisions. It can be argued that the preamble, read together with articles 2 and 3 of the CRC, contributes to the argument that every child has the right to grow up in a family environment surrounded by an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. If one includes the sexual orientation of a person in the list of grounds for nondiscrimination relating to parents, one can further argue that not only the child but also his or her parents have the right to be a family without any discrimination on the grounds of the sexual orientation of the parents.
Article 20 of the ACRWC reaffirms the responsibilities of parents, providing that parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child, and to ensure that the best interests of the child is their primary concern at all times. They further have the duty to secure conditions of living necessary to the child's development, within their abilities and financial capabilities. 94 The sexual orientation of a person will not influence these responsibilities.
The views of the child
The CRC further makes provision in article 12 for a child who is capable of forming his or her own views to express those views freely in all matters that concern him or her, and that such views be given due weight in accordance with the child's age and maturity. Further, the child shall be given the opportunity to be heard in all judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or by means of a representative body. 95 Children are empowered by this provision to express their 94 Article 20(1) of the ACRWC states that: "(1) Parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the primary responsibility of the upbringing and development of the child and shall have the duty: (a) to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic concern at all times-(b) to secure, within their abilities and financial capabilities, conditions of living necessary to the child's development; and (c) to ensure that domestic discipline is administered with humanity and in manner consistent with the inherent dignity of the child."
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Article 12 of the CRC states that: "(1) States Parties shall ensure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. (2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law." views freely and also to communicate them in judicial and any other proceedings where their interests are at stake. 96 This provision creates certain standards against which the law can be measured and is of great importance in divorce litigation where it is necessary for courts to gain an understanding of the views and wishes of the children concerned in the particular matter. 97 The goal of hearing the voice of a child is not to treat their views as decisive factors in divorce decisions, but rather to take the views into consideration where possible. 98 Accordingly, it can be argued that in the divorce of their parents, children can express their views in the matter of with which parent who they wish to reside, either directly or by means of a representative, and the court can give consideration to these views with regards to the child's age and maturity.
Further, according to article 4(2) of the ACRWC, a child who is capable of communicating his or her views shall be afforded the opportunity for his/her views to be heard in all judicial or administrative proceedings concerning the child. This opportunity will be afforded either directly or through an impartial representative.
99
The participation rights of children stem from the expanding recognition of the autonomy of every child and children's right to have a say in matters that concern them. 100 A positive aspect of the phrasing of the ACRWC is the fact that it does not include the internal limitation of "in accordance with the age and maturity of the child", as does the CRC. 101 The difference between the CRC and the ACRWC in the phrasing of a child's participation right must be noted. Whereas the CRC refers to a child who is "capable of forming" his or her views, the ACRWC refers only to a child who is "capable of communicating" his or her views. Article 4 of the ACRWC states that: "(1) In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. (2) In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his/her own views, and opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law."
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Gose African Charter 124.
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Gose African Charter 127.
to communicate their views. 102 It can therefore be argued that in the divorce of their parents, children can express their views in the matter of which parent with whom they wish to reside, either directly or by means of a representative, and the court can give consideration to these views with regards to the child's view without taking onto consideration the internal limitation of age and maturity.
Concluding remarks
It is clear from the above discussion on the CRC and the ACRWC that they argued that in the divorce of their parents, children can express their views in the matter of which parent they wish to reside with, either directly or by means of a representative, and that the court can give consideration to such views without limitation of age and maturity. As in the CRC, the ACRWC makes no mention as to a specific sex orientation of the parents that would be in the best interests of the child, such as having two parents of a different gender as against two parents of the same gender. The ACRWC also makes no mention of whether or not a parent's particular sexual orientation would be detrimental to the well-being of the child. Rather, it can be argued that the parents of the child should have the financial capability to 102 Gose African Charter 125.
103
Own emphasis.
provide a child with the standard of living necessary for the child's upbringing and development. Furthermore, it can be argued, interpreting the ACRWC together with the CRC and section 28(2) of the Constitution, that the decision taken by courts relating to the granting of care of a child to a parent in divorce proceedings should be taken in the child's best interests regardless of the sexual orientation of the parent, and that the child should be given an opportunity to express his or her views regarding the decision in such a manner as is consistent with his or her age and maturity.
The role of the South-African courts in their approach towards homosexuality and the suitability of homosexuals as parents has been significant. The position pre-1994 and post-1994 will consequently be discussed further.
Case law
It is accepted that the interests of children will be best served within the family Families come in different shapes and sizes. The definition of the family also changes as social practices and traditions change. In recognising the importance of the family, we must take care not to entrench particular forms of family at the expense of other forms.
Furthermore, the approach of courts as well as members of society towards homosexuality and the suitability of homosexuals as parents is progressively changing. This is clearly reflected in jurisprudence in which constitutional norms and values are applied to the issue of homosexuality.
112
Since South-Africa's shift to a democratic dispensation in 1994 major changes in the South-African private law has taken place. 113 Several constitutional provisions have brought about changes in the way in which courts will decide to grant a duty of care to a parent in divorce proceedings where the homosexuality of a parent is a consideration. 114 The courts are obliged to assume an approach different from that taken prior to 1994 in considering the relationship between homosexual parents and their children. 
Pre-1994
In Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 116 the applicant was seeking a definition of her right to access her two minor children. The applicant had enjoyed her right of access liberally for a period of six years after her divorce from the respondent, the father of the children. 117 The issue before the court arose after the respondent remarried and had a change of mind in terms of the access arrangements regarding the mother of the children. 118 The issue did not involve capability or the suitability of the applicant to be a mother to her children, but rather the fact that she was a lesbian. She was not only involved in a lesbian relationship, but also shared a house and room with her partner. 119 The question before the court related to the desirability of the lesbian mother to have access to her minor children. The court stated that the issue simply came down to the fact of the style of living, the attitude towards living, the activities, the behaviour and whatever else was involved in the context of lesbianism. 120 This issue, according to the court, did however raise certain difficulties. The first problem was that the applicant could live in whichever way she liked. She had an interest that the court should try to respect and protect. But, insofar as the interests of the children were concerned, she would have to make a choice between persisting in those activities or part thereof and having access on a wider basis than would otherwise be permitted. should be appropriately done with regards to the children. 121 The second difficulty, as raised by the Court, was that the access had thus far been on the basis of an undertaking that she would "stay away from sexuality" as far as the children were concerned, and therefore that certain "things" 122 should not take place in their presence. 123 The Applicant argued that no explicit sexual intimacy had taken place in front of or in the presence of the children, but the court stated that confusing signals encompassed much more than that. The signals that were given to the two minor children, contrary to what they should be taught as being normal and correct, was that two females shared a bed and obviously not for reasons of lack of space on a particular night, but as a matter of preference and mutual emotional attachment.
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The court argued that this was detrimental to the children because it sent the wrong signal, and that one should take cognisance of the inadvisability of sending wrong signals. 125 Further, Deputy Judge President Flemming 126 stated that:
What the experts say to me is so self-evident that, even without them, I believe that any right-thinking person would say it is important that the children stay away from confusing signals as to how the sexuality of the male and of the female should develop.
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The court ordered the Respondent to permit the applicant to exercise reasonable rights of access to her minor children, subject to the condition that, when the children slept at the Applicant's residence, the Applicant was not to share a room with her partner. The court further ordered that when the children spent school
The parties were not in agreement as to what these "things" were.
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Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 329 G-H.
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The court described signals of emotional attachment not only as kissing and hugging, but also as a way of speaking, the words of endearment used, and the manner in which people looked at each other.
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Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 330A.
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Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 328I-329A.
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In V v V 188F-189B Judge Foxcroft stated that: "It is so that the Court (in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen) made a moral judgement about what is normal and correct insofar as sexuality is concerned…the learned Judge regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal. The present equality clause (s 9) in the Constitution makes it quite clear that the State may not unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, on one or more grounds, including sexual orientation…In law, it is therefore wrong to describe a homosexual orientation as abnormal."
holidays with the applicant, the mother's partner was not to share the same residence or sleep under the same roof as the applicant and the children.
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Although the decision of the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen was made in the pre-1994 period, it has been severely criticised, mainly on the grounds that the court made a moral judgement as to what was correct and normal in so far as the sexuality of the mother was concerned, 129 and that it promoted homophobic bias by basing its findings on false stereotypes or perceived community intolerance. 130 The decision has also been described as demonstrating that legal prescriptions in the pre-1994 period had become outmoded. 131 Pertaining to the fact that the court regarded the homosexuality of the mother as abnormal, it can be argued that the court's pre-conceived conviction led to its decision that the children would be negatively affected if they were to be exposed to it. 133 Van Heerden 134 explains that:
In the absence of any empirical evidence that supports the notion that children who are raised by gay or lesbian parents are exposed to a greater danger and will be more likely to suffer from psychiatric, social, gender-identity or other disorders than children that are raised by heterosexual parents, this judgement smacks of blatant homophobia. automatically act any differently from any heterosexual couples due to their sexual orientation is also the product of homophobia, and (in the context of section 9(2) of the Constitution) clearly amounts to discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.
In the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Fourie v Minister (SCA), Judge Cameron 136 stated that:
Permanent same-sex life partners are entitled to found their relationships in a manner that accords with their sexual orientation; such relationships should not be subjected to unfair discrimination. Gays and lesbians in same-sex life partnerships are as capable as heterosexual spouses of expressing and sharing love in its manifold forms. They are likewise as capable of forming intimate, permanent, committed, monogamous, loyal and enduring relationships; of furnishing emotional and spiritual support; and of providing physical care, financial support and assistance in running the common household. They have in short the same ability to establish a consortium omnis vitae. Finally, they are capable of constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing, enjoying and benefiting from family life in a way that is not distinguishable in any significant respect from that of heterosexual spouses.
One can clearly derive a homophobic stance from the court's views and judgement regarding the homosexuality of the mother and the undesirability of having her children exposed to it. The court not only judged the mother's sexual orientation, but its decision was also solely based on the grounds of her "abnormal" sexual orientation and the wrong signals that it would give to her children. This is a clear infringement of the mother's right to non-discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution, had the decision been made after the Constitution came into force.
The Court further would have failed to promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights by developing the common law or legislation, as it is obliged to in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.
The following case will give a clear indication as to the changes that certain provisions have brought to parents in divorce proceedings, where their sexual orientation is a factor for consideration in the granting of child care.
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Fourie v Minister (SCA) 439E-440C.
Post-1994
In the case of V v V, the issue before the court related largely to the divorce of the parties, the custody of the children and the access arrangements. 137 The plaintiff, the father of the children, sought an order for custody of the children, and was prepared to allow the defendant, the mother of the children, access under the supervision of the plaintiff or his nominee. The plaintiff claimed a further provision granting that whenever the defendant exercised her right to access to the children, no third person would share the same residence or sleep under the same roof as the defendant and the children.
138
One reason for the request for the inclusion of this condition was that the plaintiff feared that the children would be subjected to the allegedly harmful influence of a lesbian relationship between the mother and her partner. The other reason for this request was the state of mind of the defendant. 139 A number of medical specialists supported his view that she suffered from a condition known to psychiatrists as "borderline personality disorder", resulting from trauma experienced in her teenage years. 140 The plaintiff feared that the children would be mentally, emotionally and spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle their mother and her companion shared. 141 He further made it clear several times during the trial that he was concerned that his children could grow up with a homosexual orientation if subjected to the influence of a home where their mother openly lived with a lesbian partner, and stated that he did not wish to have his children exposed to what he regarded as unhealthy practices in their mother's home. 142 It was for that reason that he insisted that their mother have free access to the children only when her lesbian companion was not physically present. McCall, the court referred to the list of criteria that Judge King had set out in the matter to make a decision that would be in the best interests of the child. The court stated that a number of similar "checklists" were used in situations such as the present, but that they represented accumulated case law and therefore served only as guidelines. 145 Each case was different and had to be determined on its own facts.
The court stated that it was clear that the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen made a moral judgement about what was normal and correct insofar as sexuality was concerned, and that there could be no doubt that the judge regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal.
146 Further, the court emphasised the fact that the present equality clause enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution, clearly stated that the State or any other person might not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more of the listed grounds. Therefore it was wrong in law to describe a homosexual person as being abnormal. 147 Equally important, the court expressed the opinion that the difficulty in cases relating to the custody of children was that one was only indirectly dealing with the rights of parents. The child's rights were of paramount importance and needed to be protected, and certain situations would arise where the best interests of the child required that action be taken for the benefit of the child, effectively cutting across the parents' rights. 148 De Vos 149 reasons that:
There is nothing inherently wrong or abnormal about a lesbian relationship. But while the child is growing up, there will be strong recrimination from peers and given by the fact that the children know that, contrary to what they should be taught as to what they should be guided as to be correct (that is male and female who share a bed), one finds two females doing this…as a matter of preference and as a matter of mutual emotional attachment…It is detrimental to the child because it is a wrong signal."
149 De Vos 1994 SALJ 691. other parents against the child as it becomes known that his or her mother is a lesbian. The child might also become confused and distressed by his or her mother's unwillingness to conform to a generally accepted norm. It might therefore be in the best interest of the child to discriminate against the lesbian mother, because that will be the only way in which her children could be spared unnecessary suffering.
The court referred to the article of De Vos, stating that there may well be situations where a court will override the equality clause in the best interest of protecting the child, but that would only be in cases regarding the meaning of the reasonableness of such limitation, such as in the Canadian case of R v Oakes. 150 The court further referred to the conclusion drawn by De Vos, namely: 151 A discriminatory order by the Court against a lesbian mother in an application for access rights to her children that is solely based on her sexual orientation will not easily pass Constitutional muster. In the same way that the court cannot take cognisance of racism or religious intolerance when it decides on the access of a mother to her children, the Court cannot take cognisance of prejudice in our society. To do that would be to unreasonably limit, or perhaps to even negate the essential content of the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation.
Against this background, the court came to the conclusion that there was no doubt from the evidence before the court that the defendant was a good and suitable mother, and by compelling her to exercise access rights to her children in the position of a visitor to the father's home would be unjust. The image of a mother being permitted to visit her children only under supervision would be unfair to her and also to her children, and the children would feel that their mother was being punished because of the underlying risk that her lifestyle would influence them in the wrong direction. The court reasoned that the best protection it could grant the children was to allow a continuing lifestyle with both parents under joint custody and to allow them to decide for themselves whether the lifestyle of the mother or that of the father was more harmful. 4.3 The application of case law to "care" in the Children's Act
Even though the decisions of the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V were made before the Children's Act came into operation, the following section of this article will focus on applying the facts of both cases to the concept of care as it is currently defined in the Children's Act, to reach a conclusion as to whether the parents in both cases would have been regarded by the court as suitable to care for their children.
In the cases of Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen and V v V, one can argue that there was no dispute between the parties as to the ability of the mother to provide the children with a suitable place to live or the necessary financial support; to ensure and secure the fulfilment and guard against infringement of the child's rights as set out in the Bill of Rights and the principles as set out in section 2 of the Children's Act; to guide, advise and assist the child in decision-making in a manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of development; to guide the behaviour of the child in a humane manner; to maintain a sound relationship with the child; and to accommodate any special needs that the child might have -as the mother in both cases had previously enjoyed access until a certain point in time.
One can, however, note that the arguments before the court in both cases involved the ability of the mother to provide living conditions that were conducive to the child's health, well-being and development; to protect the child from emotional or 153 P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA) 101J-102B (hereafter referred to as P v P).
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P v P 101J-102B. moral harms or hazards; to guide, direct and secure the child's education and upbringing, including its religious and cultural upbringing, in a manner appropriate to the child's age, maturity and stage of development; and to ensure that the best interests of the child were the paramount concern in all matters affecting the child. This is due to the fact that the court in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen explicitly stated that the problem before them did not arise from a question as to the capability or the suitability of the applicant to be a mother to her children, but from the fact that she was a lesbian and shared a home and room with her partner. 155 The court further emphasised that the issue was the style of living, the attitude towards living, the activities, behaviour and whatever else was involved in the context of lesbianism. 156 The court regarded the (undesirable) signals that the children might receive from observing that two females were living together, which the court characterised as being contrary to what should be taught as normal and correct, and expressed the opinion that the receipt of such signals would be detrimental to the children. 157 The issue before the court in V v V also related to the children's subjection to the alleged harmful influence of the mother and her partner's lesbian relationship. 158 The second reason for the issue before the court related to the state of mind of the defendant, as she was said to suffer from a condition known as "borderline personality disorder" pertaining from trauma experienced in her teenage years. 159 It later became apparent, however, that the plaintiff's primary objection to joint custody with the mother arose from his wife's sexual orientation. ensure that the best interests of the child were of paramount concern in all matters affecting the child. Upon consideration of the views and judgement of the courts it becomes apparent that the transformation brought about by the Constitution and its provisions relating to equality in respect of homosexual parents and the extent to which courts should or should not consider parents' sexual orientation in the granting of childcare has been remarkable. It has also been shown that courts in general view the best interests of the child as interlinked with the rights of other members of the family and society as a whole. 164 One can further note that the role of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has changed to a great extent in response to the coming into operation of the Constitution rather than in response to the change of concept from custody to care since the coming into operation of the Children's Act. little more than to simplify the court's task in establishing the content of the duty of care.
Conclusion
The object of this article has been to investigate the legal position as to whether the sexual orientation of a parent should be a considering factor in the granting of care of children, as well as to establish to what extent courts should give consideration to such factor. The question that arose from the article is: has the role of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child changed since the change in concept from custody to care after the coming into operation of the Children's Act?
Section 9 of the Constitution very clearly prohibits unfair discrimination against persons, either directly or indirectly, by the State or any natural person, on several grounds. Of special relevance to this study is the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of one's sexual orientation.
Since the Children's Act came into operation, certain terms have been substituted for previous common-law terms that existed in the amended Child Care Act. These terms include the concept of care, which was previously known as custody. The concept of care entails a more comprehensive description of a parent's daily life regarding the child, and the powers and duties that are expected to ensure the general protection, well-being and best interests of the child.
The protection of the best interests of the child is one of the guiding principles in all matters relating to children, and has been enshrined in national legislation and international treaties, such as section 28(2) of the Constitution, sections 7 and 9 of the Children's Act, article 3 of the CRC and article 4 of the ACRWC. Although the different provisions in legislation refer to the standard of the best interests of the child in different ways, all of them relate to the simple fact that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in all actions concerning the child. This standard has specific importance in care disputes, as it would be a guiding and fundamental principle and most probably the basis on which the decision of the court will be made. The standard of the best interests of the child does not reference the specific sexual orientation of a parent. It is argued that even though a parent applying for the care of a child is homosexual, his or her sexual orientation as a sole factor would not carry any weight in the light of the guiding factors provided in section 7 of the Children's Act. Provided that the applicant satisfies the court that he or she complies with the criteria set out in section 7 of the Children's Act, the person would be regarded as a suitable parent to care for the child. and correct insofar as sexuality is concerned, and that there could be no doubt that the judge regarded homosexuality as being per se abnormal. 165 Further, the court emphasised the fact that the equality clause found in section 9 of the Constitution clearly states that the State or any other person may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more of the listed grounds, one such being sexual orientation. Therefore it was wrong in law to describe a homosexual person as being abnormal. The court regarded the mother as a good and suitable mother to her children, despite the fact that she was homosexual, and allowed the children to decide for themselves which lifestyle they wanted to pursue. V v V could be regarded as a landmark case, illustrating the transformation brought about by the Constitution and its provisions on equality, and the extent to which the courts can give consideration to the parents' sexual orientation in the granting of child care.
Accordingly, with regards to the non-discrimination clause contained in section 9 of the Constitution, the right of every person to inherent dignity, and the judgement 165 See s 4.1 of this contribution regarding the judge's moral judgment and the effect it had on the child's best interest.
handed down in V v V, one can come to the conclusion that the courts can no longer deny parents care and contact with their children based solely on their sexual orientation. When one interprets section 1 of the Children's Act, which defines the concept of care, with section 7 of the Children's Act, which defines the standard of the best interests of the child, one notes that the courts have a detailed list of factors to apply in granting care to a parent. It is submitted that the role of a parent's sexual orientation in determining the best interests of the child has changed to a great extent due to the coming into operation of the Constitution, 166 and to a lesser extent due to the change of concept from custody to care since the coming into operation of the Children's Act. It is further argued that the change of term has not changed matters in consideration of the sexual orientation of a parent in relation to granting the care of a child, but has merely simplified the court's task in establishing the content of the duty of care.
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Changes in society's perception regarding homosexuality fall outside the scope of this contribution.
Van 
